1. A Comparative Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms

Simin Naghavi؛ Yasaman Sarlati؛ Faria Nassiri Mofakham

دوره 3، ویژه نامه ، بهار 1392، ، صفحه 125-138

  Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auction. Any auction mechanism needs to be budget balanced, Pareto optimal, individually rational, and coalition-proof. Satisfying all these properties is not so much trivial so that no multi-attribute double auction ...  بیشتر